Nobody questions the connection of Kenyan Somalis to the soil of the northeastern region, where most of them live: what is disputed is the question of whether or not this makes them Kenyan. ), improved: urban: 84% of populationrural: 48.1% of populationtotal: 58.2% of populationunimproved: urban: 16% of populationrural: 51.9% of populationtotal: 41.8% of population (2020 est. ), Kenyan shillings (KES) per US dollar -109.638 (2021 est. Both the increased visibility of Somali politicians in Kenya, even in areas with a non-Somali majority population, and the growth of the Kenyan Somali population, according to the 2009 census, have intensified anxieties about Somalis taking over Kenya. 52. A similar trend could be observed from the total Kenyan panel, in which the national identification over the ethnic one rose from about 40% (2005/2006) to about 54% (2016/2018). Examples are Aden Duale, who became the Majority Leader of the National Assembly, Amina Mohammed Jibril, Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Adan Mohammed, Cabinet Secretary for Industrialization. ), number of registered air carriers: 25 (2020)inventory of registered aircraft operated by air carriers: 188annual passenger traffic on registered air carriers: 5,935,831 (2018)annual freight traffic on registered air carriers: 294.97 million (2018) mt-km, total: 16over 3,047 m: 52,438 to 3,047 m: 21,524 to 2,437 m: 2914 to 1,523 m: 6under 914 m: 1 (2021), total: 1811,524 to 2,437 m: 14914 to 1,523 m: 107under 914 m: 60 (2021), 4 km oil, 1,432 km refined products (2018), total: 3,819 km (2018)standard gauge: 485 km (2018) 1.435-m gaugenarrow gauge: 3,334 km (2018) 1.000-m gauge, total: 161,452 km (2018)paved: 14,420 km (2017) (8,500 km highways, 1,872 urban roads, and 4,048 rural roads)unpaved: 147,032 km (2017), (2011) none specifically; the only significant inland waterway is the part of Lake Victoria within the boundaries of Kenya; Kisumu is the main port and has ferry connections to Uganda and Tanzania, total: 25by type: oil tanker 3, other 22 (2022), major seaport(s): Kisumu, MombasaLNG terminal(s) (import): Mombasa, Kenya Defense Forces (KDF): Kenya Army, Kenya Navy, Kenya Air Force (2023)note 1: the National Police Service maintains internal security and reports to the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government; it includes a paramilitary General Service Unit and Rapid Deployment Unitnote 2: the Kenya Coast Guard Service (established 2018) is under the Ministry of Interior but led by a military officer and comprised of personnel from the military, as well as the National Police Service, intelligence services, and other government agencies, 1.2% of GDP (2021 est. )5.24% (2019 est.). The establishment of Jubbaland in 2013 cemented the return of Ogaden political relevance to Somalia. This means: at an individual level, an Ogaden from there might feel the urge or need or might be compelled . The latter is often connected to a nomadic lifestyle, which tends to ignore national borders,Footnote89 adding to the perception of disloyality to the soil. Firstly, politicians demanded the closure of the refugee camps near the Somali border.Footnote72 Developments indicate that, this time, the Kenyan government seriously intends to shut down the refugee camp complex of Dadaab, despite a High Court ruling denouncing the planned closure as unconstitutional.Footnote73 Secondly, there were crackdowns on Somalian refugees living outside the camps. Anderson, Remembering Wagalla, 662663. Similar living experiences can also result from internal migration, often for educational reasons or because of work. This is especially pronounced in the case of urbanized Somalis living outside the northeastern region. Kenya was, after Somalia, the second largest recipient of US-American anti-terrorism funds in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2013 and 2015. http://securityassistance.org/data/country/military/country/2011/2018/is_all/Africa [accessed 14 March 2017]. )wind: 10.7% of total installed capacity (2020 est. [9] History [ edit] Pre-colonial era [ edit] Did you know that with a free Taylor & Francis Online account you can gain access to the following benefits? N. Rugene and D. Kalinaki, Abdul Hajis Mission to Rescue Brother Blessing for Westgate Hostages. Daily Nation, 25 September 2013. http://www.nation.co.ke/news/How-Abdul-Haji-rescued-Westgate-hostages/1056-2007316-5ol57g/index.html. )solar: 1% of total installed capacity (2020 est. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Fact Sheet, Kenya (01-31 December 2017). Their positioning in a gray space within Kenyan society, leaves them neither integrated nor eliminated, forming pseudo-permanent margins.Footnote9 What impact the new urgency to form a more united Kenyan nation, following the post-election violence in 20072008, has on its Somali population is discussed below. The Ogaden contains oil and gas fields, but development has been hampered by instability in the region. 5. This inability to speak Somali was true even though Abdullahis brothers mainly lived within Somali circles: their closest contacts were members of the extended kin network and of their own clan and the flat in which Abdullahi was living was situated in a Somali middle class neighbourhood. Ceded to Ethiopia by the British in 1954, Ogaden has twice been fought over with Somalia, which claims the region . )percent of population: 29% (2021 est. Kenyan Somalis are drawn back and forth between an emphasis on their ethnic Somaliness and their belonging to Kenya as citizens they share their socialization with other fellow Kenyans, but are treated as if not quite belonging to Kenya. Daily Nation, Kenya Vows to Appeal Verdict Blocking Dadaab Camp Closure, 9 February 2017. http://www.nation.co.ke/news/High-Court-cancels-closure-of-Dabaab/1056-3806030-7enmgdz/index.html; Daily Nation, Weve to Shut Dadaab for Security, Uhuru Kenyatta Tells UN, 8 March 2017. http://www.nation.co.ke/news/-Dadaab-Uhuru-Kenyatta-UN-Antonio-Guterres/1056-3841890-2qvff6z/index.html. This notion laid the basis for rendering all Kenyan Somalis as non-native Africans after independence.Footnote81 In the late 1990s and early 2000s Somali Members of Parliament spoke about a policy of apartheid and of biological nationalism.Footnote82 The only other group having such an in-between status are Nubians,Footnote83 who have to go through a similar vetting process when applying for national identification documents, which includes not only the presentation of numerous documents (such as parents birth certificates), but also the recognition by a chief to indeed belong to the local community.Footnote84, The racial component also plays out in the daily life of Kenyan Somalis. This move, already planned before 2011, was realized after several kidnappings in the northeastern region in 2011 (see Lind et al., Killing a Mosquito, 4). 17. The term furthermore encompasses the diverse roles in which Kenyan Somalis can find themselves: as marginalized citizens in the northeastern region, as high-ranking politicians, as businesspeople in the metropoles and as urbanized (lower) middle class Kenyans. )$4,500 (2020 est. note: data are in current year dollars$11.471 billion (2019 est. These clashes revived the discussion over what it means to be Kenyan, yet who is imagined as belonging to the nation, and to what degree, remains a situational matter. This was widely celebrated across the Ogadeen population in the Horn of Africa and in the diaspora. The Somalis who live in North Eastern Province of Greater Somalia in the present day Kenya are close to three million (3,000,000) in the 2019 Kenya National Census with another 400,000 Somalia refugees in several Kenya refugee camps. Interview with Ibrahim, Nairobi, September 2010. On average, around 7 people live in each house; access to drinking water is very limited (barely 38% of the population). This figure, however, seems too low. At the same time, new trade routes emerged between Kenya and Somalia. This strategy of stigmatization informed the security measures taken. 31. 19. )53.2% of GDP (2016 est. Accessed March 6, 2018. http://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/01/Kenya-Operation-Factsheet-December-2017-.pdf. Last but not least the term ambiguous citizenship encapsulates different dimensions of citizenship while people can be treated as belonging in some of them, they are not necessarily categorized as citizens in others. Candidates aimed at maximizing the numbers of their own group, either by registering their voters in their area, or by driving others out.Footnote59 Even though the territorialization of ethnicity already started in colonial times, it was strengthened with re-introducing the multi-party system in 1992, and further intensified with devolution.Footnote60 The 47 county governments furthermore control about 30% of national revenue, divided between them in part according to population size, deepening discussions about the census figures of 2009.Footnote61. 39. They share this cleavage with other Kenyan Muslims, especially coastal Arabs and Swahili. In the colonial classification, urbanized alien Somalis neither counted as European, nor as truly Asian or as clearly African, but as something in between, not fitting the categories. the song Narudi nyumbani/coming home by Nameless, written in 2010 as a tribute to Kenyan sportspeople who represent (their) nation), advertisements (such as Niko na Safaricom/I have Safaricom, a mobile network operator in Kenya) and TV shows.Footnote43 Furthermore, the idea was at the core of civil society initiatives. 57. )exports: 0 cubic meters (2021 est. Horn of Africa. Kenya's involvement in the peace talks is based on security cooperation with . Morgan, "Ethnic Geography of Kenya," 79. Yet devolution also led to new power struggles. Tabea Scharrer http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5640-116X. 110. Kenyan Somalis have become a stronger part of the Kenyan political sphere, as well as of the Kenyan economy, yet they are still marginalized in terms of legal recognition of their citizenship. 38. ), exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies: due to drought conditions - about 4.4 million people were projected to be severely acutely food insecure between October and December 2022 reflecting consecutive poor rainy seasons since late 2020 that affected crop and livestock production; prices of maize are at high levels across the country due to reduced availabilities and high fuel prices inflating production and transportation costs (2023), municipal solid waste generated annually: 5,595,099 tons (2010 est. )101.991 (2019 est. Janet McIntosh argues in her article about white citizens of Kenya, who, similar to Kenyan Somalis, have a conspicuous minority status, that even though the Kenyan government stated that all Kenyans are indigenous,Footnote80 this phrase implicitly only refers to Kenyans of African descent, linking national belonging to race. 61. )$8.297 billion (31 December 2020 est. The biggest group of Somalis moving to the cities were therefore not refugees, but Kenyan Somalis whose migration resulted partly from the changing structures in the northeastern region. ), total: 674,191 (2020 est. )agricultural: 3.23 billion cubic meters (2020 est. Kenya has experienced dramatic population growth since the mid-20th century as a result of its high birth rate and its declining mortality rate. KHRC, Foreigners at Home, 2426; Interview with Amina, August 2016. )1.2% of GDP (2020)1.2% of GDP (2019)1.3% of GDP (2018)1.4% of GDP (2017), approximately 24,000 personnel (20,000 Army; 1,500 Navy; 2,500 Air Force) (2022), the KDF's inventory traditionally carried mostly older or second-hand Western weapons systems, particularly from France, the UK, and the US; however, since the 2000s it has sought to modernize and diversify its imports, and suppliers have included more than a dozen countries including China, Italy, and the US (2022), no conscription; 18-26 years of age for male and female voluntary service (under 18 with parental consent; upper limit 30 years of age for specialists, tradesmen, or women with a diploma; 39 years of age for chaplains/imams); 9-year service obligation (7 years for Kenyan Navy) and subsequent 3-year re-enlistments; applicants must be Kenyan citizens (2022), 260 Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO); 3,650 Somalia (ATMIS) (2022)note: in November 2022, Kenya sent approximately 1,000 troops to the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as part of a newly formed East Africa Community Regional Force (EACRF) to assist the DRC military against the rebel group M23; the force is led by Kenya, the KDF is considered to be an experienced, effective, and professional force; it has conducted operations in neighboring Somalia since 2011 and taken part in numerous regional peacekeeping and security missions; it is a leading member of the Africa Standby Force; the KDF trains regularly, participates in multinational exercises, and has ties to a variety of foreign militaries, including those of France, the UK, and the US; its chief security concerns and missions include protecting the countrys sovereignty and territory, regional disputes, the threat posed by the al-Shabaab terrorist group based in neighboring Somalia, maritime crime and piracy, and assisting civil authorities in responding to emergency, disaster, or political unrest as requestedthe Army has 5 combat brigades, including 3 infantry, an armored, and an artillery brigade; it also has a helicopter-equipped air cavalry battalion and a special operations regiment comprised of airborne, special forces, and ranger battalions; the Navy has several offshore patrol vessels, large coastal patrol boats, and missile-armed craft; the Air Force has a small inventory of older US-origin fighter aircraft, as well as some transport aircraft and combat helicopters Kenyan military forces intervened in Somalia in October 2011 to combat the al Qaida-affiliated al-Shabaab terrorist group, which had conducted numerous cross-border attacks into Kenya; in November 2011, the UN and the African Union invited Kenya to incorporate its forces into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); Kenyan forces were formally integrated into AMISOM in February 2012; they consist of approximately 3,600 troops and are responsible for AMISOMs Sector 2 comprising Lower and Middle Jubba (see Appendix T for additional details on al-Shabaab; note - as of May 2022, AMISOM was renamed the AU Transition Mission in Somalia or ATMIS)the Kenya Military Forces were created following independence in 1963; the current KDF was established and its composition laid out in the 2010 constitution; it is governed by the Kenya Defense Forces Act of 2012; the Army traces its origins back to the Kings African Rifles (KAR), a British colonial regiment raised from Britain's East Africa possessions from 1902 until independence in the 1960s; the KAR conducted both military and internal security functions within the colonial territories, and served outside the territories during the World Wars (2023), the International Maritime Bureau reported no piracy attacks in the territorial and offshore waters of Kenya in 2022; although the opportunity for incidents has reduced, the Somali pirates continue to possess the capability and capacity to carry out incidents; in the past, vessels have also been targeted off Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mozambique, as well as in the Indian ocean, and off the west and south coasts of India and west Maldives; generally, Somali pirates tend to be well armed with automatic weapons, RPGs and sometimes use skiffs launched from mother vessels, which may be hijacked fishing vessels or dhows; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-003 - Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin-Threats to Commercial Vessels) effective 23 February 2023, which states in part that "Regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas" that shipping in territorial and offshore waters in the Indian Ocean remain at risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships, al-Shabaab; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)/Qods Forcenote: details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T, Kenya-Ethiopia: their border was demarcated in the 1950s and approved in 1970; in 2012, Kenya and Ethiopia agreed to redemarcate their boundary following disputes over beacons and cross-border crime, Kenya-Somalia: Kenya works hard to prevent the clan and militia fighting in Somalia from spreading across the border, which has long been open to nomadic pastoralists; in 2021, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave Somalia control over a disputed ocean area where the seabeds are believed to hold vasts oil and gas deposits; the ICJ ruling gave Somalia the rights to several offshore oil exploration blocks previously claimed by Kenya; Kenya did not recognize the courts decision, Kenya-South Sudan: two thirds of the boundary that separates Kenya and South Sudan's sovereignty known as the Ilemi Triangle has been unclear since British colonial times; Kenya has administered the area since colonial times; officials from Kenya and South Sudan signed a memorandum of understanding on boundary delimitation and demarcation and agreed to set up a joint committee; as of July 2019, the demarcation process was to begin in 90 days, but was delayed due to a lack of funding, Kenya-Sudan: Kenya served as an important mediator in brokering Sudan's north-south separation in February 2005, Kenya-Tanzania: Kenya and Tanzania were conducting a joint reaffirmation process in November 2021 to ensure the border was visibly marked with pillars, Kenya-Uganda: Kenya and Uganda began a joint demarcation of the boundary in 2021, refugees (country of origin): 21,620 (Ethiopia), 8,159 (Burundi), 5,540 (Sudan) (2022); 281,319 (Somalia), 157,402 (South Sudan), 72,192 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2023)IDPs: 190,000 (election-related violence, intercommunal violence, resource conflicts, al-Shabaab attacks in 2017 and 2018) (2021)stateless persons: 16,779 (2022); note - the stateless population consists of Nubians, Kenyan Somalis, and coastal Arabs; the Nubians are descendants of Sudanese soldiers recruited by the British to fight for them in East Africa more than a century ago; Nubians did not receive Kenyan citizenship when the country became independent in 1963; only recently have Nubians become a formally recognized tribe and had less trouble obtaining national IDs; Galjeel and other Somalis who have lived in Kenya for decades are included with more recent Somali refugees and denied ID cards, a transit country for a variety of illicit drugs, including heroin and cocaine; transit location for precursor chemicals used to produce methamphetamine and other drugs; transshipment country for heroin from Southwest Asia destined for international markets, mainly Europe, and cocaine transits shipped through Ethiopia from South America; cultivates cannabis and miraa (khat) for both local use and export, total population growth rate v. urban population growth rate, 2000-2030, Children under the age of 5 years underweight, International law organization participation, Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income, Household income or consumption by percentage share, Civil aircraft registration country code prefix, Military and security service personnel strengths, Military equipment inventories and acquisitions, Refugees and internally displaced persons, Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI). He is working as a project manager in an IT company, even though had never gone to university due to financial reasons. Interview with Abdullahi, Mombasa, August 2011. 65. Since Kenyas independence in 1963, the question of how to incorporate the heterogenous parts of its society has been a vital issue. )other: 45.8% (2018 est. The post-election violence of 20072008, during which more than 1,000 Kenyans died and more than 300,000 were displaced, resulted in heightened perceptions to rebuild the country as a nation of diversity. Following McIntoshs contention that one way to claim Kenyanness is to appeal to a civic nationalism, in which all groups invested in the nation are equally welcome, this article argues based on ethnographic data gathered since 2010 as well as archival sources that many Kenyan Somalis are ready to take this possibility up, if they have the chance to do so. The heterogeneous Somali population in Kenya can roughly be categorized into four groups. See Whittaker, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. These developments, however, are overshadowed by the securitization discourse in the Kenyan public sphere. One of the biggest took place in April 2014 as usalama watch (security watch), when police went to urban neighbourhoods where ethnic Somalis live to arrest foreign nationals and terrorism suspects.Footnote74 The government also used extra-judicial killings and disappearances mainly in the northeastern region, returning to strategies employed under emergency regulations.Footnote75 Thirdly, the border to Somalia was temporarily closed and in 2015 Kenya started to build a wall along it. Letter by B. Jommo, Cross-ethnic and Proud of Ourselves, Daily Nation, 14 August 2009. http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Letters/440806-639674-8crbl7z/index.html. 79. Kenyans has humiliated our people in Kenya. ), total: 20 yearsmale: 19.9 yearsfemale: 20.1 years (2020 est. It is Kenya that does not want Somalis in Kenya.Footnote10, Even in colonial times, the Somali population of British East Africa was treated differently from other inhabitants.
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